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CONSENT IN MARRIAGE: A RADICAL FEMINIST
ANALYSIS OF PAKISTANI LAW
IQRA SALEEM KHAN*
I. PAKISTANI MARITAL RAPE LAWS
II. MARITAL RAPE AND SPOUSAL RIGHTS UNDER ISLAMIC LAW
III. RADICAL FEMINISM ON SEX, RAPE AND ‘CONSENT’
IV. LEGAL SEX IN PAKISTAN
V. OBLIGATION TO ‘CONSENT’
VI. OBLIGED TO ‘CONSENT’
VII. RECLAIMING SEXUAL AUTONOMY
A. Reconceiving Marital Rape
B. Reconceiving Sex
In Abdul Kadir v. Salima, Mahmood J summarised the nature
of a Pakistani wife’s duties under Islamic Law.1 The nikkah contract
“imposes submission on the wife when summoned to the couch and
confers on him the power of correction when she is disobedient or
rebellious.”2 Earlier, a similar pronouncement was made across the
ocean in the United Kingdom by Sir Matthew Hale that through the
marriage contract the “wife hath given herself to the husband, consent
of which she cannot retract.”3 Marital rape was later recognised as
an offence in the UK by the House of Lords in R v. R.4 In Pakistan,
however, the jurisprudence behind the decision in Abdul Kadir con-
tinues to prevail.5 This Essay will assess the offence of rape in Paki-
stan and analyse the difficulty in prosecuting marital rape cases.
The discussion will also focus on the underlying source of this diffi-
culty, being the corresponding rights of spouses under Islamic law,
particularly the husband’s right to obedience and sexual access to the
wife.6 A critique of these spousal rights will then be presented using
* Iqra Saleem Khan is a lecturer on Islamic Law and Legal Theory at The Institute
of Legal Studies, Pakistan. She is a member of the Women’s Action Forum, Lahore and
serves as an editor for the socio-legal feminist journal Bayan. Email iqra@tils.edu.pk.
1. See Abdul Kadir v. Salima, (1886) ILR 8 All 149 (Pak).
2. See id.
3. SIR MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 628 (Sollom
Emlyn ed., 1778).
4. Regina v. R., (1991) UKHL 12 (Pak.).
5. See Shahbaz Ahmad Cheema, Revisiting Abdul Kadir v Salima: Locus Classicus
on Civil Nature of Marriage?, 49 AL-ADWA 63 (2018).
6. See Mohd Mukhils Bin Mohd Nasri & Mohd Afandi Bin Awang Hamat, Islamic
Perspective on the Legality of Marital Rape in the Framework of Maqasid Al Shariah, 3
6TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE 161, 162 (2017).
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radical feminist jurisprudence, particularly the works of Catherine
MacKinnon, Robin West, and Andrea Dworkin. The subject of in-
quiry is the nature of a Pakistani wife’s ‘consent’ in light of social,
economic and sexual inequalities prevalent in an Islamic marriage
and whether exploitation of the same renders a consent-based defi-
nition of rape redundant.
I. PAKISTANI MARITAL RAPE LAWS
Before 2006, Section 6 of Hudood Ordinance, 1979 defined rape
(zina bil-jabr) as:
. . . sexual inter-course with a woman or man, as the case may
be, to whom he or she is not validly married, in any of the follow-
ing circumstances, namely:—
(a) against the will of the victim,
(b) without the consent of the victim,
(c) with the consent of the victim, when the consent has been
obtained by putting the victim in fear of death or of hurt, or
(d) with the consent of the victim, when the offender knows
that the offender is not validly married to the victim and that
the consent is given because the victim believes that the
offender is another person to whom the victim is or believes
herself or himself to be validly married.7
This language explicitly excluded marital rape from the legal
definition of rape till 2006, when the Protection of Women (Criminal
Laws Amendment) Act was enacted and the definition of the offence
was amended:
A man is said to commit rape who has sexual intercourse with
a woman under circumstances falling under any of the five fol-
lowing descriptions,
(i) against her will,
(ii) without her consent,
(iii) with her consent, when the consent has been obtained
by putting her in fear of death or of hurt,
(iv) with her consent, when the man knows that he is not
married to her and that the consent is given because she
believes that the man is another person to whom she is or
believes herself to be married; or
(v) With or without her consent when she is under sixteen
years of age.
7. The Offence of Zina (Enforcement Of Hudood) Ordinance, No. 7 of 1979, § 6(1)
THE GAZETTE OF PAKISTAN EXTRAORDINARY, Feb. 9, 1979 (emphasis added) [hereinafter
Zina Ordinance].
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Explanation: Penetration is sufficient to constitute the sexual inter-
course necessary to the offence of rape.8
The new language is broad enough to include marital rape, as
‘a woman’ could refer to the perpetrator’s own wife.9 Nevertheless,
to date there have not been any reported cases involving marital
rape.10 A provision pertaining to ‘unnatural intercourse’ with a man,
woman, or animal has been invoked in negligible instances by women
accusing their husbands of non-consensual sodomy,11 however that
issue is separate and unrelated for our purposes.12 This is not to say
that there are no occurrences of non-consensual intercourse as de-
fined in section 375 of the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC).13 The scant
number of local surveys conducted in Pakistan confirm this.14 In a
2003 domestic violence survey, nearly 47% of married women living
in Islamabad and Rawalpindi reported having non-consensual sex.15
Zaman and Zia argue that the absence of any reported marital rape
cases is likely due to “the ambiguity of the law and socio-cultural lack
of acceptance of marital rape as an offence.”16 These socio-cultural
reasons include Islamic injunctions that impose rigid gendered rights
and duties on each spouse.17 It is also worth noting that Article 227
of the Pakistani Constitution requires all laws to be in conformity
with the Quran and Sunnah.18 Therefore, in order to understand the
8. The Penal Code, Act No. 45 of 1860, PAK. PENAL CODE § 375 (1860) (emphasis
added).
9. Id.
10. Gulmeena Roghani, Marital Rape: As Heinous as a War Crime, COURTING THE
LAW (Feb. 16, 2018), http://courtingthelaw.com/2018/02/16/commentary/marital-rape-as
-heinous-as-a-war-crime [https://perma.cc/3YZQ-CWFV].
11. Staff Report, Man in Jhelum Arrested for ‘Marital Rape and Sodomy’ on Wife’s
Complaint, PAKISTAN TODAY (Jan. 18, 2018), https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2018/01
/18/man-in-jhelum-arrested-for-marital-rape-and-sodomy-on-wifes-complaint [https://
perma.cc/6DC2-27H2].
12.The Penal Code § 377. Unnatural offences:
Whoever voluntarily has carnal intercourse against the order of nature with
any man, woman or animal, shall be punished with imprisonment for life,
or with imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less
than two years nor more than ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.
13. The Penal Code § 375.
14. See Ali Shaikh, Is Domestic Violence Endemic in Pakistan: Perspectives from
Pakistani Wives, 10 PAK. J. MED. SCI. 23, 23 (2003).
15. Id. at 27.
16. See SARAH ZAMAN & MALIHA ZIA, WOMEN’S ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN PAKISTAN (2012),
https://www.ohchr.org/documents/HRBodies/CEDAW/AccesstoJustice/AuratFoundation
AndWarAgainstRape_Pakistan.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2020).
17. See Qur’an 4:34.
18. See PAKISTAN CONST. art. 227, § 1. Section 1 Provisions relating to the Holy Quran
and Sunnah: “(1) All existing laws shall be brought in conformity with the Injunctions of
Islam as laid down in the Holy Quran and Sunnah, in this Part referred to as the Injunc-
tions of Islam, and no law shall be enacted which is repugnant to such Injunctions.”
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legal nature of marriage in Pakistan, a discussion regarding the fea-
tures of marriage under Islamic law becomes necessary.
II. MARITAL RAPE AND SPOUSAL RIGHTS UNDER ISLAMIC LAW
The relationship between a husband and wife in Shariah is best
elucidated by Surah An-Nisa, verse 34 in the Quran19: “Men are the
protectors and maintainers of women, because Allah has given the
one more [strength] than the other, and because they support them
from their means. Therefore the righteous women are devoutly obe-
dient, and guard in [the husband’s] absence what Allah would have
them guard.”20
Marriage in Islamic law is a civil contract.21 Each spouse has
rights and corresponding duties towards the other within the union.22
The husband, having authority (qiwama) over the wife, has an obliga-
tion to provide for her monetary welfare i.e., maintenance (nafaqa).23
The wife has a reciprocal duty to obey (ta’a) the husband.24 Abdur
Rahman I. Doi remarks that this arrangement reflects the need for
a figurehead in marriage to maintain peace and harmony.25 The ex-
tent of the wife’s obedience towards the husband, however, is con-
tested amongst jurists.26 The majority argue that obedience extends
to both social and sexual matters, in that the wife must not leave the
matrimonial home without the husband’s permission and must ful-
fill every (legitimate) demand of the husband.27 The minority, such
as Asghar Ali Engineer, require obedience only in sexual matters.28
It is argued that since intercourse outside of marriage is prohibited
and criminalised under Shariah, spouses in a marriage have a right
to sexual intercourse with, and company of each other.29 This, it is
19. The Qur’an is the primary and most authoritative source of Islamic Law. All
Pakistani laws are either expressly or tacitly in line with Quranic injunctions.
20. Qur’an 4:34 (stating “guarding what Allah would have them guard,” which here
refers to the honor of the husband).
21. See Kecia Ali, Marriage Contracts in Islamic Jurisprudence, THE FEMINIST SEXUAL
ETHICS PROJECT (June 19, 2003), https://www.brandeis.edu/projects/fse/muslim/marriage
.html [https://perma.cc/TEL8-ZN3M].
22. See id.
23. GENDER AND EQUALITY IN MUSLIM FAMILY LAW: JUSTICE AND ETHICS IN THE
ISLAMIC LEGAL TRADITION 10 (Ziba Mir-Hosseini et al. eds., 2013) [hereinafter GENDER
AND EQUALITY IN MUSLIM FAMILY LAW].
24. See id.
25. See ABDUR RAHMAN I. DOI, SHARIAH: ISLAMIC LAW 216–17 (2 ed., 2008).
26. See Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban & Lois Bardsley-Sirois, Obedience (Ta’a) in Muslim
Marriage: Religious Interpretation and Applied Law in Egypt, 21 J. COMP. FAM. STUD.
39, 40 (1990).
27. See id.
28. See ASGHARALI ENGINEER, THE RIGHTS OF WOMEN IN ISLAM 6–7 (2008).
29. See, e.g., Islamic Scholar: Wife Cannot Deny Husband Sex ‘Even When Riding on
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argued, is to prevent adultery and illicit sexual behaviour in society.30
If, then, the wife refuses the sexual advances of her husband without
a valid justification (health, menstruation or fasting), she is deemed
to be disobedient (nashiza) and in breach of her moral and religious
duties.31 As a consequence, she loses her reciprocal right to mainte-
nance from the husband.32 No corresponding penalty exists for the
sexually unwilling husband.33 To prevent real or perceived disobedi-
ence from the wife, the husband can also physically chastise her.34
Surah An-Nisa, verse 34 continues “. . . and the ones whom you fear
their non-compliance, then admonish them and forsake them in their
beds, and strike them (i.e., hit them lightly) yet in case they obey you,
then do not seek inequitably any way against them.”35
It is no surprise then, that marital rape as a concept is largely
unknown in traditional Islamic law. Forced intercourse, if coupled
with excessive violence or cruelty (dhara), may constitute grounds for
judicial dissolution of marriage for the Maliki school of thought.36
However, non-consensual intercourse with a wife by itself is not a
recognized legal offence in any of the Sunni or Shia schools of thought,
although many Islamic jurists consider it a moral sin.37
Islamic feminists have criticised these injunctions as a product of
patriarchal interpretations of ambiguous sacred texts by pre-twentieth
century Islamic jurists.38 Ziba Mir-Hosseini, for example, argues that
these discriminatory rulings are in direct contradiction with equality
and justice which are amongst the undisputed objectives of Shariah.39
a Camel,’ THE JERUSALEM POST (Apr. 28, 2015), https://www.jpost.com/International
/Islamic-scholar-Wife-cannot-deny-husband-sex-even-when-riding-on-a-camel-399454
[https://perma.cc/K8YZ-HCDE] [hereinafter Islamic Scholar].
30. See, e.g., Betwa Sharma, Islam’s Sex License, THE DAILY BEAST (Jul. 14, 2017),
https://www.thedailybeast.com/islams-sex-licenses [https://perma.cc/582W-2NZ5].
31. See Islamic Scholar, supra note 29.
32. See Muhammad Jawad Mughniyya, The Right to Maintenance, AL-ISLAM, https://
www.al-islam.org/five-schools-islamic-law-sheikh-muhammad-jawad-mughniyya/right
-maintenance [https://perma.cc/89N8-E95A].
33. See, e.g., Naqiba Barikzai, Afghanistan: The Taboo of Sexual Rejection, REFWORLD,
https://www.refworld.org/docid/58875bbb4.html [https://perma.cc/J9JX-G7SU].
34. See Qur’an 3:34.
35. See Qur’an 4:34. Doi asserts that while this is generally discouraged by jurists,
if the husband finds the wife’s behaviour going against Islam then “beating in a light
manner may become necessary.” DOI, supra note 25, at 217.
36. Delfina Serrano, Rape in Maliki Legal Doctrine and Practice (8th–15th Centuries
C.E.), 5 HAWWA 166, 170 (2007).
37. Nasri & Hamat, supra note 6, at 162, 168–75.
38. See GENDER AND EQUALITY IN MUSLIM FAMILY LAW, supra note 23, at 19–20.
39. See GENDER AND EQUALITY IN MUSLIM FAMILY LAW, supra note 23, at 8. The
organisation Musawah, comprised of Islamic feminists, is proactively working to change
patriarchal interpretations in Islamic Law from within the Islamic legal tradition. See
MUSAWAH: FOR EQUALITY IN THE FAMILY, https://www.musawah.org [https://perma.cc
/P5V5-UGGG] (last visited Mar. 22, 2020).
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Fatima Mernissi, similarly, highlights the importance placed on
women’s sexual needs in primary Islamic sources, conveniently dis-
regarded by orthodox Islamic jurists.40
Nonetheless, several modern Shariah-based legal systems have
incorporated traditionally interpreted features of marriage as en-
forceable spousal rights and duties.41 Examples include the UAE
Federal Law (28) of 2005 on Personal Status,42 the Tunisian Code of
Personal Status,43 and the Libyan Law of Personal Status No.10 of
1984.44 In South Asia, the earlier quoted case of Abdul Kadir v. Salima
is cited as an authority on the nature of Islamic marriage and its legal
implications.45 In Pakistan, Section 9 of the Muslim Family Law Ordi-
nance 1961 imposes a legal duty on the husband to maintain his
wife and children.46 Paris Diwan argues that this duty is contingent
upon the wife submitting to the husband’s authority, obeying his
reasonable orders, and remaining faithful.47 The suit for restitution
of conjugal rights, a remedy available in India, Pakistan, and Ban-
gladesh, allows the husband to enforce his legal right of obedience
through the courts.48 In Moonshee Buzloor Ruheem v. Shumsoonissa
Begum, the court likened the remedy to specific performance, high-
lighting the ‘proprietary interest’ of the husband in the wife.49 Al-
though the court cannot physically compel the wife to return to her
husband, once a decree of restitution has been awarded, the husband
no longer has a legal duty to maintain his nashiza (disobedient) wife.50
The foregoing discussion indicates the reciprocal rights and duties
of the spouses within Islamic Law, as traditionally interpreted and
incorporated in Modern legislatures. The husband is the head of the
household with economic, social and sexual powers vested in him by
40. FATIMA MERNISSI, BEYOND THE VEIL: MALE-FEMALE DYNAMICS IN MODERN MUSLIM
SOCIETY (2d ed., 1987).
41. See GENDER AND EQUALITY IN MUSLIM FAMILY LAW, supra note 23, at 20–21.
42. See Federal Law No. (28) of 2005 on Personal Status, ch. 5: Mutual Rights (U.A.E.);
George Sfeir, The Tunisian Code of Personal Status, 11 MIDDLE EAST J. 309, 310 (1957).
43. See Sfeir, supra note 42, at 310.
44. See Law of Personal Status No.10 of 1984, arts. 17–18 (Lybia).
45. See Cheema, supra note 5, at 63.
46. Muslim Family Law Ordinance, No. 8 of 1961 § 9, THE GAZETTE OF PAKISTAN
EXTRAORDINARY, 1961 (“Maintenance. (1) If any husband fails to maintain his wife ade-
quately, or where there are more wives than one, fails to maintain them equitably, the
wife, or all or any of the wives, may, in addition to seeking any other legal remedy avail-
able, apply to the Chairman who shall constitute an Arbitration Council to determine
the matter, and the Arbitration Council may issue a certificate specifying the amount
which shall be paid as maintenance by the husband.”).
47. PARAS DIWAN, MUSLIM LAW IN MODERN INDIA (3d ed. 1985).
48. See Cheema, supra note 5, at 72.
49. See Moonshee Buzloor Runeem v. Shumsoonnissa Begum, (1867) 11 M.I. A. 551.
50. See Mst. Sahi Bi v. Khalid Hussain, (1973) SCMR 577 (Pak.).
2020] A RADICAL FEMINIST ANALYSIS OF PAKISTANI LAW 677
virtue of God, whereas the wife is deemed an economic and social
dependant of the husband.51
III. RADICAL FEMINISM ON SEX, RAPE AND ‘CONSENT’
The radical feminist view considers gender roles a product of male
sexual domination of women.52 Domination is constitutive of what
being a woman is in a patriarchal society; to be a woman is to be
sexually submissive and to be objectified.53 She provides sex—while
he receives it—in what is an unequal hierarchy of power relations.54
Society reinforces this hierarchy; pornography fetishes it; the law
protects it.55 As Catherine MacKinnon asserts: “The state is male in
the feminist sense: the law sees and treats women the way men see
and treat women . . . . The state’s formal norms recapitulate the
male point of view on the level of design.”56
Nowhere does this apply more aptly than to the model of mar-
riage under Islamic law in Pakistan. As discussed earlier, sexual
submission is an express obligation of the wife.57 It is so important,
that marriage isn’t deemed complete and maintenance isn’t deemed
obligatory on the husband until the marriage is consummated.58
Once she has submitted to the husband sexually, she can no longer
withhold or refuse sex to compel the husband to pay mahr.59 The
Quran refers to wives as “tilth” to be “plowed” by their husbands when
and however they wish.60 Andrea Dworkin suggests that under
51. See Cheema, supra note 5, at 17.
52. See id. at 27.
53. John Gardner, The Opposite of Rape, 38 OXFORD J. OF LEGAL STUD. 48, 66 (2017).
54. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Rape Redefined, 10 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 431, 452
(2016).
55. See id. at 449–50.
56. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 162 (1989).
57. See Nasri & Hamat, supra note 6, at 165–66.
58. See Cheema, supra note 5, at 74.
59. Mahr is an obligatory monetary gift made by the husband to the wife at the time
of marriage. Although earlier jurists considered mahr a consideration for the marriage
contract, Pearl and Menski assert that it is an effect of marriage that signifies the new
legal, social and sexual status of the wife. See DAVID PEARL & WERNER MENSKI, MUSLIM
FAMILY LAW 178–79 (3d ed., 1998). Abu Hanifa, the founder of the Hanifi school of thought,
opined that a wife can still refuse herself to her husband after consummation. Whereas
Abu Yusuf and Shaybani deem that consummation forfeits all future rights of the wife
to refuse her husband’s sexual rights. In India, the latter is binding. See Mt. Anis Begam
& Ors. v. Malik Muhammad Istafa Wali Khan, (1933) AIR All 634 (Ind.). In Pakistan and
Bangladesh, the opinion of Abu Hanifa holds authority. See Rahim Jan v Muhammad,
(1955) PLD 2 Lahore 122 (Pak.).
60. Qur’an 2:223 (“Your women are cultivation for you; so approach your cultivation
whenever you like . . . .” This surah was revealed in the context of what sexual positions
the husbands can use with their wives. The language indicates the expected passivity
of a wife in sex.).
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conditions of patriarchy, sex is male-centric and coercive.61 Through
intercourse, the woman “is occupied—physically, internally, in her
privacy.”62 In a marriage under traditional Muslim Law, this be-
comes a central feature of her submissive experience as a woman.63
Rape, then, is but a manifestation of the far-reaching oppres-
sion and discrimination against women in society.64 Rather than an
act done by one individual to another, it is a social practice that
sustains male domination through oppression and intimidation.65 In
legal terminology, consent is defined as “a voluntary agreement to
another’s proposition.”66 John Gardner, despite being a proponent
of consent-based legal definition of rape, nonetheless acknowledges
that “our fixation with sexual consent tends to affirm that women
are sexual commodities, sex objects, available on certain terms for
men to act upon.”67
Legal definitions of rape based on ‘consent’ disregard the fact
that under unequal conditions “many women acquiesce in or tolerate
sex they cannot as a practical matter avoid or evade.”68 In Pakistan,
a brief look at gender statistics is enough to prove these unequal
conditions.69 In marriage, the husband’s authority and right of obe-
dience under Muslim family law also demonstrates this inequality.70
Therefore, in Pakistan, the question of marital rape is not about the
absence or presence of consent.71 Rather, it pertains to the very nature
of a wife’s ‘consent’.72
61. See ANDREA DWORKIN, INTERCOURSE 63–67 (1997).
62. Id. at 122.
63. See MacKinnon, supra note 54, at 442.
64. See id.
65. Susan Griffin, Rape: The All-American Crime, RAMPARTS MAGAZINE, Sept. 1971,
26–35 (stating “rape is a kind of terrorism which severely limits the freedom of women
and makes women dependent on men . . . The threat of rape is used to deny women
employment . . . The fear of rape keeps women off the streets at night. Keeps women at
home. Keeps women passive and modest for fear that they be thought provocative.”).
66. Consent, COLLINS DICTIONARY OF LAW (3 ed. 2006), available at https://legal-diction
ary.thefreedictionary.com/consent [https://perma.cc/ZY97-PT4F] (last visited Mar. 22,
2020).
67. Gardner, supra note 53, at 69.
68. MacKinnon, supra note 54, at 465.
69. Economically, the workforce constitutes thrice as many men as women. Only
3.6% of women have any landholdings. Politically, women occupy only 17% of the seats
in Parliament. The Muslim Law of inheritance grants women half the inheritance of men.
(For more information, see Naima Tabassum, WOMEN IN PAKISTAN: STATUS IN SOCIO-
CULTURAL AND POLITICO-LEGAL DOMAINS, HIGHER EDUCATION COMMISSION PAKISTAN
(2016).)
70. Id. at 155.
71. See id. at 259.
72. See Makhdoom Shahab-ud-Din, Marital Rape a Non-Criminalized Crime, DAILY
TIMES (Apr. 13, 2019), https://dailytimes.com.pk/376098/marital-rape-a-non-criminalized
-crime [https://perma.cc/VKZ5-N6HU].
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IV. LEGAL SEX IN PAKISTAN
In Western Jurisdictions, there are no laws restricting sex out
of wedlock.73 As long as there are two adult parties, along with the
presence of consent—however troublesome a concept—the sex is
deemed to be ‘legal’.74 In Pakistan, however, sexual intercourse can
legally only take place within a heterosexual marriage.75 Sex outside
marriage is criminalised and is classified into two separate offences:
Adultery (zina) and fornication.76 Adultery, in which at least one of
the parties is or has been previously married, is a hadd (offence
against God) in Pakistan and is liable to stoning to death, ten-year
imprisonment or thirty lashes depending on the evidence available.77
Whereas, fornication is where both parties have never been married.78
After 2006, the offence is governed by s.496B of Pakistan Penal Code
and is punishable by five years in prison or a fine.79
Asifa Quaraishi argues that these laws have been used to target
unmarried women, due to pregnancy, which is considered sufficient
evidence for imprisonment and lashes, whilst men are given the bene-
fit of the doubt due to lack of evidence.80 A particularly appalling
example is the case Safia Bibi v. The State,81 where an unmarried
blind girl was charged with fornication and sentenced to three years
of imprisonment, fifteen lashes and a 1000 rupee fine due to the ‘proof’
of her pregnancy, whereas the two men she accused of raping her
were acquitted due to lack of evidence.82 Before 2006, accusing a man
of rape could be used as a confession of zina/fornication by the victim
in the event of insufficient evidence of rape.83
73. See, e.g., Sasha Ingber, Utah Repeals 1973 Law That Criminalized Sex Outside of
Marriage, NPR (Mar. 29, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/03/29/708042810/utah-repeals
-1973-law-that-criminalized-sex-outside-of-marriage [https://perma.cc/B68A-F2QN].
74. See, e.g., Massachusetts Law About Sex, MASS.GOV (June 12, 2019), https://www
.mass.gov/info-details/massachusetts-law-about-sex [https://perma.cc/5WAC-76WW].
75. In the event of rape, if proved in court, the victim becomes exempt from these
laws, while the perpetrator is considered to commit zina/fornication.
76. Zina Ordinance, supra note 7, at §§ 4–5.
77. Id. If four males testify to witnessing the zina, the punishment is stoning to death.
Evidence falling short of that results in the perpetrator getting jailed and/or flogged (tazir).
78. Protection of Women Act, No. 45 of 1860, § 496B, THE GAZETTE OF PAKISTAN
EXTRAORDINARY, Dec. 1, 2006.
79. Id. (“Fornication: (1) A man and a woman not married to each other are said to
commit fornication if they wilfully have sexual intercourse with one another. (2) Who-
ever commits fornication shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may
extend to five years and shall also be liable to a fine not exceeding ten thousand rupees.”).
80. Asifa Quaraishi, Her Honor: An Islamic Critique of the Rape Laws of Pakistan
from a Woman-Sensitive Perspective, 18 MICH. J. INT’L L. 287 (1997).
81. (1985) P.L.D. Fed. Shariat Ct. 120 (Pak.).
82. Id.
83. Quaraishi, supra note 80.
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These laws, together with cultural segregation, ensure that for
the vast majority of women in Pakistan, the only experience of sexual
intercourse is within marriage.84 The stakes in a law regarding mari-
tal rape, thus, are raised even higher, especially since many women
in Pakistan are pressured and even forced into arranged marriages.85
Against this background, a question that needs serious reflection is
this; in a country where many women don’t even have the power to
‘consent’ to a marriage, how many truly ‘consent’ to have sex within
that marriage?
The Pakistani legal discourse on rape has not even begun to grap-
ple with this dilemma. By borrowing an already inadequate consent-
based definition of (marital) rape from the West, the context in which
Pakistani women are compelled to have sex is completely ignored.86
V. OBLIGATION TO ‘CONSENT’87
A qualitative study of wives in Iran—a neighbour state also
governed by Islamic Law—found that the majority of women inter-
viewed considered “unconditional sexual submission” towards the
husband as their main religious duty.88 These women also reported
84. RURAL DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTE, WOMEN’S INHERITANCE RIGHTS TO LAND AND
PROPERTY IN SOUTH ASIA: A STUDY OF AFGHANISTAN, BANGLADESH, INDIA, NEPAL, PAKI-
STAN, AND SRI LANKA 58 (2009), https://www.landesa.org/wp-content/uploads/WJF-Womens
-Inheritance-Six-South-Asian-Countries.FINAL_12-15-09.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2020)
(Women are expected to maintain the honour of their families which tends to restrict their
freedom of mobility, dress, etc. and they are generally expected to take care of household
tasks.).
85. Pakistani Law requires the female’s “consent” for a marriage contract to be valid.
See Abdul Waheed v. Asthma Jahangir, (1997) PLD Lahore 301. Despite this, forced
arranged marriages are a common feature of Pakistani culture. According to the 2016
statistics released by the UK Forced Marriage Unit (FMU), 43% of cases involving a
victim who was either at risk of being or had already been in a forced marriage that the
Unit handled originated from Pakistan. UK HOME OFFICE AND FOREIGN & COMMON-
WEALTH OFFICE, FORCED MARRIAGE UNIT STATISTICS (2016), https://www.gov.uk/govern
ment/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/597869/Forced_Marriage_Unit_sta
tistics-_2016.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2020).
86. See Robin West, Equality Theory, Marital Rape, and the Promise of the Four-
teenth Amendment, 42 U. FLA. L. REV. 45, 63–66 (1990); see also MacKinnon, supra note
54, at 435–36.
87. The language of obligation versus obliged is borrowed from H.L.A. Hart’s linguis-
tic philosophy in The Concept of Law. Obligation towards a rule is an internal phenomena,
whereby in the event of deviation from the rule, the subject has a critical reflective attitude
(CRA) recognising a broken standard of conduct, even if the subject personally doesn’t like
or want to follow that standard of conduct. An obliged subject, on the other hand, experi-
ences no such critical reflection, merely following a rule due to fear of an unwanted conse-
quence i.e., sanction. While Hart uses this in the context of positive law, the language is
especially useful in differentiating how a woman may consent to intercourse she feels an
obligation towards, versus her consent procured through fear of a consequence i.e., obliged.
Both have negative consequences for women’s freedom to have sex. The law of rape in
Pakistan fails to adequately deal with both. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961).
88. Zohreh Ghorashi, Mohammad Najafi & Effat Merghati Khoei, Religious Teachings
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experiencing feelings of guilt and shame if they were unable to fulfil
this religious duty, believing that they were not good Muslims.89 A
similar qualitative study in Pakistan, after interviewing participants
living in Karachi, noted “Many men and also women believe that
‘sex is a man’s right in marriage.’”90
This is directly in line with authoritative religious traditions.91
One hadith (saying) widely attributed to Prophet Muhammad states,
“If a man calls his wife to his bed and she refuses, and he spends the
night angry with her, the angels will curse her until morning.”92
When wives believe it is their religious obligation to physically
satisfy the husband, does their consent to sex truly constitute a “volun-
tary” agreement? If so, to what end? “Consent,” as understood tradi-
tionally, fails to answer this question. It disregards the surrender of
sexual autonomy and bodily integrity by a wife in an Islamic marriage
to meet a prescriptive standard of piety. The Iranian study contends,
“The emphasis on sexual obedience is so deeply rooted in the Islamic
culture that even women who have adequately tried to be sexually
obedient still may feel guilty . . . . This guilt weakens the woman’s
sexual agency and in turn threatens her mental health and welfare.”93
Sex is no longer an activity two partners freely partake in for
mutual pleasure. Rather, “consent” here legitimises cases where wives
have sex that they don’t initiate, want, or desire, but still ‘voluntar-
ily’ agree to.94 The analysis of Robin West in this regard is particu-
larly illuminating:
What the victim of routinised rape within marriage does, sexually,
is a product not of what the victim wills but of what her attacker
demands . . . she wants literally to please him rather than her-
self because to please herself is too dangerous. The victim of mari-
tal rape gains survival, but she sacrifices self-sovereignty.95
and Sexuality of Women Living in Rafsanjan: A Qualitative Inquiry, 15 INT’L J. REPROD.
BIOMED. (YAZD) 771, 773 (2017).
89. Id. at 774.
90. Rafat Hussain & Adeel Khan, Women’s Perceptions and Experiences of Sexual
Violence in Marital Relationships and Its Effect on Reproductive Health, 29 HEALTH
CARE FOR WOMEN INT’L 468, 477 (2008).
91. Id.; Hadith No. 143, available at https://sunnah.com/muslim/16/143 (last visited
Mar. 22, 2020) (Muslim wives believe it is a sin to refuse sexual intercourse when de-
manded by the husband, which is punishable in the hereafter, purportedly through
hellfire.).
92. See Hadith No. 143, supra note 91.
93. Ghorashi, Najafi & Khoei, supra note 88, at 774.
94. See MacKinnon, supra note 54, at 440, 447.
95. Robin West, Equality Theory, Marital Rape, and the Promise of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 42 U. FLA. L. REV. 45, 69 (1990).
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Consider this: A Pakistani wife believes it is morally right to
sexually submit to her husband even when she, at the particular
moment or even generally, does not really want to have sex.96 She be-
lieves the husband has more say over her body than she does.97 That
is the natural order of things.98 That this is about his pleasure, as
ordained by God.99 She internalises this as an obligation. That she
experiences internal conflict when she is, for whatever reason, unable
to fulfill her sexual obligation indicates the depth of this internalisa-
tion. One participant in the Pakistani study described how, upon
non-compliance, her husband’s verbal taunts (“why did you get mar-
ried?”) only furthered her resentment .100 The concept of consent
(understood as a voluntary agreement) given by the wife to her hus-
band’s sexual advances doesn’t contextualise this prescriptive power
dynamic that has permeated the very sense of self of the wife.101 She
has to give “consent,” because she is a good Muslim wife.102 Catherine
MacKinnon similarly argues that “consensual is a fall-back stand-in
for ‘it wasn’t so bad’ in societies in which sex by definition fulfills
rather than violates women, because sex is what women are for.”103
That Pakistani women have accepted their sexual submission
is most evident by an older participant’s response in the Pakistani
study to the purported psychological trauma some younger wives
expressed feeling from undesired sex, “This is part of marriage—
many men behave like this, but young women these days think only
of themselves.”104
If the law of rape in Pakistan is meant to protect women’s sexual
autonomy and integrity, then it completely disregards the Pakistani
woman’s internalised sexual submission in marriage. And if all sex
is legally supposed to occur within marriage, then the law of rape in
Pakistan goes even further; it sustains this sexual submission by
clothing it under the guise of ‘consent’.
VI. OBLIGED TO ‘CONSENT’105
Even if a Pakistani wife may not experience an internal obligation
to sexually submit to her husband, there are external consequences
96. See Hussain & Khan, supra note 90, at 477.
97. See id.
98. See Hadith No. 143, supra note 91.
99. See id.
100. Hussain & Khan, supra note 90, at 472.
101. See id. at 477.
102. See Igor Primorac, Radical Feminism on Rape, 8 DRUSTVENA ISTRAZIVANJA 497,
501–02 (1999).
103. MacKinnon, supra note 54, at 452 (emphasis added).
104. Hussain & Khan, supra note 90, at 473.
105. Supra note 75.
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for a disobedient wife—condoned and protected by Pakistani law—
that still yet cast doubt on the nature of her ‘consent’.106
This may include:
1. Polygamy: Valid and practiced in Pakistan, the husband
can legally contract up to four wives without the permis-
sion, or even knowledge, of his previous ones.107 s.6 of
the Muslim Family Law Ordinance (MFLO) 1961 atte-
mpted to regulate polygamy by requiring the husband to
first seek permission from the Arbitration Council (whi-
ch can grant such a permission without the consent of
the first wife).108 However, Pearl and Menski argue
that this is a largely dead letter law, as marriages con-
travening Section 6 are still legally valid.109 For many
women, polygamy is considered an extreme affront to
their status as a wife.110 Fear or threat of a second
marriage may oblige an unwilling wife to have inter-
course, yet her compulsion would still constitute ‘con-
sent’ within § 375 of the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC) that
criminalises rape.111
2. Cutting-off of maintenance: As discussed earlier, the
husband in Pakistan is the legally ordained breadwinner
of the family.112 The wife has no responsibility to earn
or work.113 On the surface this may seem to hold men
financially accountable for their wives.114 In reality,
106. Abira Ashfaq, Pakistani Law for Women: A Friend or Foe?, THE HERALD (Jan. 25,
2019), https://herald.dawn.com/news/1398790 [https://perma.cc/3C9V-6DNZ].
107. Kalbe Ali, Permission from Earlier Wives not Required for New Marriage: Sherani,
DAWN (Mar. 25, 2015), https://www.dawn.com/news/1171757 [https://perma.cc/RDL5
-N7GV].
108. Muslim Family Law Ordinance, supra note 46, § 6.
109. DAVID PEARL & WERNER MENSKI, MUSLIM FAMILY LAW (3d ed. 1998).
110. Woman Set Herself on Fire After Husband’s Threat of Second Marriage, PAK.
TODAY (May, 9 2016), https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2016/05/09/woman-set-herself
-on-fire-after-husbands-threat-of-second-marriage [https://perma.cc/ECK6-Z22D] (last
visited Mar. 22, 2020) (albeit an extreme case, it does reveal the sentiment of Pakistani
women towards polygamy).
111. Act XLV of 1860, No. 375 of 1860, PAK. PENAL CODE (1860).
112. Muslim Family Law Ordinance, supra note 46, § 9.
113. Indeed, most don’t. Only 25.7% of married Pakistani women reported being
employed, compared to 95.7% married men, in a large-scale demographic survey. This
may not always be out of choice. Strict gender roles put structural hurdles in the way of
women who want to gain economic independence. See PAKISTAN NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF
POPULATION STUDIES & ICF INTERNATIONAL, PAKISTAN DEMOGRAPHIC AND HEALTH SUR-
VEY 2012/13 200 (2013), https://dhsprogram.com/pubs/pdf/FR290/FR290.pdf (last visited
Mar. 22, 2020).
114. See id. at 45, 61.
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however, this law furthers the power imbalance within
a marriage, whereby the husband holds most, if not
all, of the economic power.115 His duty to maintain the
wife is contingent upon her fulfilling the husband’s
marital needs, including sex.116 To some, this arrange-
ment may seem eerily akin to legally ordained prosti-
tution; one cannot indeed deny the similarities. It is
only natural then, that the wife ‘consents’ to his sexual
advances—the alternative means the husband now
has a right to deny food or shelter.117
3. Verbal or physical reprimand: Beyond severe physical
injury, the Pakistani courts are largely indifferent
towards abused wives.118 In Sayeeda Khanum v. Mu-
hammad Sami119 the Lahore High Court termed the
husband’s use of occasional violence towards the wife
as mere ‘bad manners’, and not habitual assault or
cruelty for the purposes of judicial divorce under Sec-
tion 2(vii)(a) of DMMA 1939.120 Another example is the
case of Muhammad Sadiq v. Mst. Aisha where the judge
held obiter that cutting off the nose of the wife will not
constitute “habitual” assault or cruelty under Section
2(vii)(a), as—naturally—that can only be done once.121
The law, thus, offers negligible protection to battered
wives. It officiates male physical dominance over the
female. Under such circumstances, s.375 of PPC crimi-
nalising consent obtained through ‘death or hurt’ is of
no real effect or use in marital rape cases.122
4. Perhaps worst of all—divorce: Divorce law in Pakistan
allows the husband to orally divorce (talaq) his wife,123
without the need of showing any just cause.124 There is
115. See Rozina Karmalinani et al., UNDERSTANDING INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE IN




118. Khanam v. Sami, (1952) IV PLD 113, 121 (Pak.).
119. Id.
120. Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, No. 8 of 1939, § 2 (viii)(a), PAK. CODE (1939).
121. (1975) PLD Lahore 615 (Pak.).
122. Act XLV of 1860, supra note 111.
123. Section 7(1) of the MFLO 1961 required a written notice of the talaq to the Union
Chairman to be valid, this section was later deemed void and repugnant to Islam by the
Federal Shariat Court in Allah Rakha v. The Federation of Pakistan, (2000) PLD FSC
1 (Pak.).
124. The wife, on the other hand, has to go through the tedious process of judicial dis-
solution (if she can prove one of the grounds under § 2 of Dissolution of Muslim Marriages
Act 1939) or judicial khula (wherein she has to return her mahr).
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no concept of alimony in Pakistani law after the three
months of obligatory waiting period (iddat) the divorced
wife has to observe.125 Many divorced women, in addi-
tion to facing social stigma, are rendered destitute as
a consequence, a fact noted in a report by the Pakistan
Commission.126 The practical consequences of divorce
for most Pakistani women, therefore, far outweighs any
perceived sense of sexual violation felt during marital
rape.127 When there is no way out of an abusive mar-
riage due to economic and social dependency, tolera-
tion of abuse becomes the only option. The current law
equates this toleration with ‘consent’.
None of the above cases would constitute marital rape in Pakistani
law as it stands. Law and policymakers in Pakistan, thus, need to
engage in a careful reconsideration of the nature of a Pakistani
woman’s ‘consent’, placing it in context of the unequal arrangements,
both legal and cultural, within which women have sex.
VII. RECLAIMING SEXUAL AUTONOMY
Sexual autonomy is the right/capacity of an individual to decide
the who, when, where, and how of their sex lives.128 By employing
the radical feminist lens, the inadequacy of consent as a legal stan-
dard of marital rape in a Pakistani marriage is revealed; the wife
internalises an obligation of sexual submission, which is reinforced
and strengthened through extrinsic detrimental consequences that
discourage refusal. The law has utterly failed to protect women’s
sexual autonomy in the one arrangement they can legally have sex
i.e., marriage.129 A reconception of marital rape in Pakistani law is
direly required.
125. See Inamul Ahsan v. Hussien Bano, (1976) 18 PLD Lahore 1466 (Pak.); Sadia
Begum v. Jangreez, (2004) Vol. LVI, Peshawar 213 (Pak.).
126. Pakistan Commission, Report on Marriage and Family Law, GAZETTE OF PAKISTAN
EXTRAORDINARY, at 1199 (1956).
127. AURAT FOUNDATION, PAKISTAN: NGO ALTERNATE REPORT ON CEDAW 90 (2012)
(“Marriage and family as institutions hold a great deal of importance in Pakistan and
are often thought to be more important than the concerned individuals. It is considered
important for women to not shame the family and not allow a marriage to fail. There are
many taboos on divorce and unmarried women. Women are recognised primarily in their
roles within the marriage and family as wives, mothers, daughters etc. Their identity is
derived from their family.”).
128. Some radical feminists also criticise sexual autonomy as the basis of rape legis-
lation. Favouring instead a sex equality rationale for all kinds of sexual assault, as rape
is a crime of sexual discrimination. See MacKinnon, supra note 54, at 436. However, in
Pakistan, recognising women’s sexual autonomy is arguably a necessary first step.
129. Quaraishi, supra note 80, at 288.
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A. Reconceiving Marital Rape
Critics of the radical feminist analysis emphasise the difference
in gravity between cases where a woman is “forced to have sex by a
knife at her throat, and a woman having sex she has not initiated and
does not want for its own sake but for [some other] extrinsic reason,”130
but if that extrinsic reason is her own well-being, whether economic
(‘he may stop giving me maintenance’ ), social (‘he may marry an-
other woman or divorce me’ ) or physical (‘he may hit me’ ) and these
are condoned and protected by law, her legally valid ‘consent’ be-
comes little more than a veil for coerced sex.131
This is not to say that all sex within a marriage governed by
Muslim family laws is coercive. What it suggests is that any subse-
quent legislative or judicial endeavour on marital rape in Pakistan
must take into account the subtleties and nuances of ‘consent’, in-
cluding the circumstances where consent is procured through eco-
nomic and social compulsion or exploitation. Catherine MacKinnon
proposes such a definition of rape, based on whether circumstantial
or legal inequalities are directly used to compel sex: “A physical
invasion of a sexual nature under circumstances of threat or use of
force, fraud, coercion, abduction, or of the abuse of power, trust, or
a position of dependency or vulnerability.”132
Mere contextual existence of inequalities between the spouses
(whether economic, social, religious or legal) will not render a sexual
encounter between them as always rape. Rather, when the husband
explicitly uses these structural inequalities to compel sexual activity
that the wife would otherwise not partake in, it would constitute as
legally coercive—rape.133 Legally valid consent is meaningless.
The laws that protect and enforce a Pakistani husband’s
structural power in marriage should also be reformed. An Islamic
country that can be used as an example is Tunisia; the girl’s explicit
consent in required in marriage; polygamy is banned; divorce can
only occur by order of the court; and the ex-wife gets postdivorce
maintenance (alimony) depending on her financial circumstances.134
130. Igor Primorac, Radical Feminism on Rape, 8 DRUŠTVENA I 497, 503
(1999).
131. Id. at 502, 504.
132. MacKinnon, supra note 54, at 474.
133. Id.
134. See Sfeir, supra note 42, at 309–10. While Tunisian family law is by no means per-
fect, it is by far the most progressive in the Islamic word. A recent bill was also approved
by the Tunisian Cabinet abolishing discriminatory Islamic inheritance laws that give men
double the inheritance of women. The bill is yet to be approved by the Tunisian Parliament.
See George Sadek, Tunisia: Cabinet Approves Bill Requiring Equal Inheritance Shares
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By using the concept of ijtihad (independent reasoning), the Tunisian
state has sought to reinterpret traditional Islamic laws to redress
some of the inequalities in an Islamic marriage.135 A similar initia-
tive should be taken in Pakistani family law.
B. Reconceiving Sex
The husband’s social/economic authority and the wife’s sexual
obedience in traditional Islamic Law has been criticised as a product
of historical masculine hegemonic discourse rather than Quranic in-
junctions by both Muslim feminists and modernist scholars alike.136
To achieve any meaningful change in Pakistani perceptions of sex, a
reinterpretation of religious literature that emphasises mutual sexual
rights, including the right of sexual autonomy, needs to be adopted
by the legislature, and applied in the courts. Cases such as Abdul
Kadir (quoted earlier) and Resham Bibi vs. Muhammad Shafi,137 that
legally endorse wife’s obedience in marriage, need to be explicitly
denounced by the Pakistani courts in light of Article 25 of the Paki-
stani Constitution, which provides for equality before the law and
prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex.138
The laws on zina and fornication, passed by the controversial
dictator Zia ul Haq in a move to gain power, as argued previously,
have been disproportionately used against women.139 Far from creat-
ing a Islamic ‘morally pure’ society, these laws have only furthered
regressive perceptions about sex. Thus, either the courts must adopt
a nondiscriminatory approach in applying this legislation, or the en-
tire legislation ought to be reformed. It is bitter irony that a legal
system failing to protect subjects from unwanted intercourse within
marriage, is so keen on criminalising any wanted intercourse out-
side marriage. Sexual autonomy goes both ways.
for Men and Women, GLOBAL LEGAL MONITOR (2018), http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news
/article/tunisia-cabinet-approves-bill-requiring-equal-inheritance-shares-for-men-and-wom
en [https://perma.cc/MGF3-ZRPQ] (last visited Mar. 22, 2020).
135. See Sadek, supra note 134.
136. For an Islamic feminist criticism, see Zainah Anwar & Ziba Mir-Hosseini, Decoding
the “DNA of Patriarchy” in Muslim Family Laws, OPEN DEMOCRACY (2012), https://www
.opendemocracy.net/en/5050/decoding-dna-of-patriarchy-in-muslim-family-laws (last visited
Mar. 22, 2020). For a modernist male critique, see Fazlur Rahman, The Status of Women
in Islam: a Modernist Interpretation, in WORLDS: STUDIES OF PURDAH IN SOUTH ASIA
(Hanna Papanek & Gail Minault eds., 1982).
137. (1967) PLD Azad J & K 32 (Pak).
138. PAKISTAN CONST. art. 25 (“Equality of citizens—(1) All citizens are equal before
the law and are entitled to equal protection of law. (2) There shall be no discrimination
on the basis of sex. (3) Nothing in this Article shall prevent the State from making any
special provision for the protection of women and children.”).
139. See Minah Ali Rathore, Women’s Rights in Pakistan: The Zina Ordinance & the
Need for Reform, 38 SCHOOL OF PUBLIC POLICY CAPSTONES 38 (2015).
